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THE LAWYER'S DUTIES TO THE COURTS
CHA im.

E. CLARK*

My first initiation into the problem of teaching legal ethics came
some thirty years ago when I, as the youngest cub on the Yale law
faculty, inherited that course by reason of the default of candidates
more suitable. I think a lesson can be drawn from this incident. On
the faculty at that time were not only law teachers of experience but
also active practitioners and distinguished judges; their leader was
the then Dean Swan, now Judge Swan, my chief for many years both
in teaching and on the bench. As to this course, however, they were
having none of it. That from a group of such rich background none
but the youngest could be drafted for the service is a commentary upon
its difficulties and somewhat doubtful rewards. My own experience,
as it occurred, did not suggest that there was error in the valuation.
It is my judgment that members of the profession who are rather
prone to criticize teachers for apparent lack of interest in this subject
should know and appreciate the difficulties involved. Institutes such
as this are therefore especially to be welcomed both for the actual
teachings they disseminate and for the opportunity for a realistic appraisal by both lawyers and teachers of that which is needed for instruction in the field.
The pedagogical problem stems mainly, to venture the assertion
of a paradox, from both the simplicity and the difficulty of the subject.
As an abstract matter everybody knows - or at least thinks he knows the difference between right and wrong, between honesty and dishonesty. Thus the subject is buttoned up before it is really opened,
the denouement made obvious before the plot is disclosed. In the
rest of the law curriculum the challenge of the problem method, which
is the essence of case study, is the opportunity to test one's powers
of analysis, of expression, and of persuasion in the pursuit of truth,
wherever it may lead. This challenge seems almost wholly removed
when questions of legal ethics arise; for these, in the main, permit or at least seem to permit - of but a single answer. Thus the problems
tend to follow a pattern in which the result is hinted at from the beginning. So the typical law student, a college graduate of some degree
*B.A. 1911, LL.B. 1913, Yale University; Dean, Yale Law School, 1929-1939;
Author of Code Pleading and other legal treatises; Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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of maturity, is likely to assume a cynical and disillusioned attitude
toward what he regards as Sunday school problems.
In years of teaching and school administration I was unable to
hit upon a solution that seemed completely satisfactory. I did conclude, however, that it is a mistake to isolate ethics and teach it as a
course distinct from the whole process of law administration. The
best approach, I came to believe, is to teach legal ethics as part of a
complete course on the legal processes, showing the structure of courts
of law, their organization and administration, the function of the
lawyer as an officer of the court, the historical division of the profession in England between barrister and solicitor, the activities of
bar associations in modem America, and the present-day movement
for law reform. Such an approach gives a better perspective and a
more correct emphasis; moreover, it stimulates interest to a greater
degree.
Since these pedagogical adventures of mine the years have passed
on, and I have now spent a decade and a half observing, from the
bench, lawyers in their predestined place in the courtroom. And that
brings me to the subject that your managers thought properly committed to my care: "The Lawyer's Duties to the Courts." Let me say
that here, too, I find the same paradox noted above: the subject is
most difficult, notwithstanding and perhaps because of its apparent
simplicity. Whatever its difficulties, I am glad to tackle it, because it
is one not only in which I believe proper perspective is most necessary
but also in which lawyers genuinely interested in the standing of
their profession tend to be unrealistic in their approach.
The trouble is that the bar leaders who organize and attend institutes do not need the benefit of them in the acute way that those
who are not present do. Moreover, the trend of our practice in America
to office work - a matter I shall advert to later - means that with
success comes less and less courtroom activity and a greater separation
of the leaders from the run-of-mine litigation in the courts. I doubt
if many of you will appreciate as fully as judges - who seem here to be
in complete agreement - the statement that the great majority of
cases that come to us, even on the appellate level, seem to be ill prepared - many even shockingly so. Of course there always is and always will be an important residuum of cases, prepared by skilled
lawyers who also know when to litigate and when to negotiate and
settle, that are a delight to hear. But one must be blind indeed if he
fails to recognize the trend in this country that is taking the top
leaders of our profession away from the courtroom and leaving the
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burden of the litigious process to those not the most capable of its
performance.
I expect your first reaction to all this will be that I am wandering
from my subject, that this is not a question of ethics at all. It may
be one of preparation for the bar, of professional ability, of legal
economics- but of morality, no. Such an objection may well have a
measure of truth. This brings me actually to the main drive of what I
should like to say. The problems we are asked to face in these discussions should not, and indeed cannot, be divorced from the total
picture of the lawyer as he operates, and has to operate, as a part of
the American legal process.
I have put the problem in the terms of actual case preparation,
for that is the way that we on the bench see it from day to day. I could
bring you many anecdotes, amusing or gay, or, at times and in contemplation of clients' predicaments, just downright sad. The situation,
I realize, is not an altogether healthy one so far as concerns the courts
themselves. We are left with an incentive to go off on "frolics of
our own" in the pursuit of justice, and may often, as counsel complain, leave not only the lawyers but the case itself far behind.
I sympathize with the objections of counsel to consideration by
the courts of matters not briefed or argued. And I can see the dangers
of such judicial forays. One of the most famous we have with us
daily in its consequences is the notorious case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
in which Story's hundred-year-old decision in Swift v. Tyson was
overthrown and state law apotheosized in the national courts without
the argument even having been presented in the extensive brief of
appellant's very distinguished counsel., The known ability of counsel
there present might perhaps have suggested judicial caution; but
the judicial tendency is natural and, I am bound to say after careful
consideration, practically inevitable. Whatever the risk, a judge must
decide a case as he thinks justice to the parties themselves actually
requires; and he cannot shut his eyes thereto because counsel have
failed to make the point properly.
I do not want to overstress the point I am making to the extent
'Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet.

1 (U.S. 1842). See my Cardozo lecture before the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946), reprinted in JuRisPRUDENCE IN ACTION
53-109 (1953); also account of the argument and reprint of the brief of Theodore
Kiendl and associates for appellant Erie Railroad in HIcKs, LEGAL RESEARCH 369372, 376-377, 391-426 (3d ed. 1942).
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of seeming querulous. I surely make no cause for criticism of our
less fortunate brothers who cannot represent prosperous clients in
luxurious offices but must spend their time in appearing before beggars like my colleagues and myself. What I do wish to show is the
picture as it unfolds before us. The standard of good case presentation
generally varies with the economic value of the litigation. Of course
we should not be surprised by this. With an occasional noteworthy
exception, usually in the field of personal liberties and often from
assigned counsel- young, brilliant, and eager- the best presentation
and argumentation come in the cases with the greatest stake at issue:
those involving, for instance, corporate reorganizations, ships and
cargo in admiralty, and unfair business competition. The most difficult, involving often the most intricate questions of state law, may
well be the small bankruptcies.
I do not find a difference as between different court levels. In
fact, justices of the Supreme Court have remarked on the inadequacy
of preparation of many of their cases. Perhaps a remark of a former
student of mine, now an outstanding New York lawyer, best highlights actuality here. When I asked him why, like other leaders of
the New York Bar, he failed to appear regularly in my court, his
answer, upon due consideration, was: "Well, to tell the truth, I cannot afford it. I cannot spend my time waiting around for you fellows
when I can do much better in my office." The moral was not the
less pointed when, a year later, I saw him in our courts representing
one of the country's greatest movie companies. Then he could afford
itd
That there are ethical aspects of the problem can be easily perceived. Thus Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in dispensing with
the verification of pleadings, substitutes instead the signature of
counsel, which carries with it his undertaking that the pleading is
meritorious and well taken and not intended merely for purposes of
delay. It is contemplated that violations of these obligations will
result in the discipline of counsel.2 Often, however, it appears that
there is so little basis for certain claims, indeed, for certain appeals,
2"For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action." The usual annotations disclose no case in which such action
was taken; indeed, there is but a single case of consideration of such a step, and
there the criticizing opinion was merely ordered indexed against the attorney's
name so as to be available should his professional conduct ever be a subject of
inquiry in any other connection, American Automobile Ass'n v. Rothman, 104
F. Supp. 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
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that violation of this rule must be assumed. More directly I have
witnessed instances in which counsel have assured the court of support
in the record for assertions as to the evidence, only to find the record
citations untrustworthy. For this, punishment could obviously be
invoked; and observers have sometimes been critical of us for not
enforcing our requirements. But the nuances between carelessness and
imperception are such that choice of a case to exploit as an example
may be far from obvious; and extensive litigation may develop out of
such a collateral order. Even so, to make it would be our duty, did
it not appear much like sweeping out the ocean with a broom. One
court alone can do little to raise the bar standards of a metropolitan
community. Could concerted action be secured - a wholly impossible
task because of the diverse sovereignties represented in the judicial
tribunals- it is doubtful if this would go far toward changing conditions so rooted in economic realities.
Contemplation of these problems in our own tribunals leads one
to look with some envy on more distant scenes. Our natural thought
is of England, where the leaders of the bar, the barristers alone,
appear for litigants in the high courts of general jurisdiction. From
the standpoint of the judiciary there is no question of the attractiveness
of the arrangement. To have always before one that fine gentleman
and distinguished scholar the English barrister makes judging a high
adventure in the company of finely tempered minds. But for the
public at large there are problems. This, without doubt, is an aristocratic system, with both the advantages and the disadvantages resulting
therefrom. It is as expensive as such a - to us - luxury must be expected to be. The English themselves have groaned under the cost,
and the latest of many commissions appointed to report on the administration of justice was created in 1947 to consider specifically reforms in practice and procedure for the purpose of reducing the cost
of litigation. The Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure - the Evershed Committee, so called from its chairman, the
learned Master of the Rolls - presented last July a documented report
to Parliament, a mine of information to any student of the actualities
of English law administration. From it, I think one can have no doubt
that the doubling - perhaps trebling under the system of leaders
and juniors - of counsel for important litigation is a prime source of
the admittedly high financial burden of litigation there. For instance,
the Committee did not feel able to recommend the American system
of "pre-trial" because that would require the separate briefing of
barristers at an early date in the litigation and consequent potential
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doubling of retainer fees. The Committee did not feel it within its
province to recommend a change in the traditional system in view
of its many and wide ramifications in English life; but a somewhat
more militant concurring minority indicated a belief that such more
drastic methods must be contemplated and studied in the future.3
There are prices which one must pay for a democracy, in which
justice is more nearly in the reach of all and financial means are not
acceptable as a test of ability to stay in the courts. Because of the
correlative price to be paid for aristocratic justice, I would not advocate it for us if it were politically feasible-as of course it is not.
Hence, if I am to make any suggestions as the burden of my paper,
the first is to recognize our system for what it is, with many defects and
obvious imperfections in the machinery but with a sound core based
upon accessibility to all. Even the contingent fee has its part in
making justice accessible. I think, therefore, it is wise to build upon
what we have, not upon some theoretical and idealistic system which we
do not have and in any event do not want.
Now from this I go on to say that I expect no millenium. The
economic forces to which I have referred will continue to operate in
the future. I do not think they should be accelerated; the inability
of courts to cope with their work load, the problem of congested
dockets, and the use of substitutes for the courts represent on the whole
undeniable developments impinging on that easy access to the courts
which I have claimed previously as their chief glory. Hence, I regard
as the chief problem for the courts, the point of attack of all organized
bars, better court organization for the dispatch of judicial business.
What has come to be known as the integrated court - the single court
system, whatever the necessary divisions, under the efficient and
businesslike direction of an effective administrator -is now a prime
necessity. Its worth has been demonstrated in jurisdictions as widely
separated as New Jersey and Puerto Rico.4 The political force sup3See discussion in my aridle, The Evershed Report and English Procedural
Reform, 29 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1046 (1954). The noted American advocate Lloyd
Paul Stryker makes "A Plea for a Divided Bar" in his book THE ART OF ADVOCACY,
c. XIII (1954), noting the attractive and glamorous features of the system without it seems to me-full consideration of the problems, including the cost, that are
in fact now giving concern to our English brethren.
4See,' e.g., Clark, Realistic Court Reform -A Study of Pending Proposals, 27
CONN. BJ. 11 (1952); Clark and Clark, Court Integration in Connecticut: A Case
Study of Steps in Judicial Reform, 59 YALE L.J. 1395 (1950); Clark and Rogers,
The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive Court Reorganization, 61
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porting the status quo is always tremendous; it is usually led, too, by
lawyers who are a part of the present system. Because of this it is
particularly important that bar associations not directly entangled in
the support of existing diversities take up and enthusiastically press
for such better court organization, with all its demonstrated correlatives: court rule-making, modem rules of procedure, and a thoroughgoing business management ranging from finances through choice and
assignment of personnel. No more important task faces the lawyer
of today. As I had occasion to say at an American Bar Association
section meeting in Boston last summer, 5 the career of the future great
Chief Justice will be in the field of law administration, rather than
of abstract law. He should be viewed as a vice-president or manager
in charge of productionl
It may seem a far cry from the lawyer's obligation as a court officer
to the business organization of the courts for lawyers and clients. But
if it is, I make no apology for the jump. I do not think the human
animal can be greatly changed; nor will exhortation improve the
caliber of the bar. Bar organization and planning will better its performance. In addition, more effective operation gives less chance for
the drastic and potentially immoral short cut to save a sinking case.
I will point out two interesting examples from current law reform
to indicate how improvement in method means improvement in lawyer
product. The first is pre-trial. The pre-trial conference, when adequately conducted, requires that the lawyer know his case thoroughly
at the time of the conference, so much so that he can make the concessions as to proof properly to be required of him. Such proper
preparation - and without it pre-trial is but a waste to all concerned means that, in general, the lawyers know their cases so well that
they do not need to litigate any but unsettled points of law. Settlements are appropriate and to be expected. The well pre-tried case
is the well-prepared case. An important by-product, too, should be
the training of junior lawyers as a part of this preliminary stage of
pre-examination of the issues, thus offering opportunity for the breaking of the usual log-jam of court calendars by reason of too few and
too busy trial lawyers.
The other example is from the appellate field, the shortening of
YALE L.J. 1147 (1952); Vanderbilt, First Five Years of the New Jersey Courts Under
the Constitution of 1947, 8 RuTGEmS L. REv. 289 (1954).
5The Section of Judicial Administration in a discussion of "Log-jams in Metropolitan Courts."
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records by the so-called appendix method, that is, the printing on appeal of only the essential facts from the original papers on deposit
in the clerk's office as an appendix to the brief presented on argument. 6
This method has many advantages, one of the most important being
the saving of printing expense, now an enormous burden to litigants.7
But, from the standpoint of the court, the chief advantage is that
counsel must study their records thoroughly before preparing their
briefs and appendices. This is the time when the case should be
studied from top to bottom, not later when the argument is imminent
or half under way. Thus the problem of scanty preparation I have
stressed above can be substantially minimized by adequate court and
trial techniques.
In advocating more of an institutional and functional approach
to all problems, ethical and otherwise, of the court process, I would
not omit or lessen stress upon individual responsibility. I think that
the long efforts to improve standards of legal education and admission
to the bar should and must be continued. Where these are not yet
adequate, as in many places they are not, it is the responsibility of the
bar to exercise leadership in raising them. So the individual lawyer
must bear responsibility for dereliction in duty; and punishment
should be swift, sure, and timely. It is clearly settled that the courts
have ample power in the premises. In fact, the question raised in
one or two atypical cases, involving the spectacular so-called political
trials - still a matter of debate in the courts and law reviews - is not
one of ultimate power but of delay in its exercise after the immediate
occasion is past.8 In general, a court is the keeper of its own dignity.
While decorum varies from court to court, I fear we must say that
eSee Dean, Proposed Rule for Hearing of Appeals upon Original Papers, 8
F.R.D. 143 (1948); Reuss, Records on Appeal, 13 F.R.D. 31 (1952), discussing the rules
of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, to which may be
added the rules of the First, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and the
just adopted Rule 11 of the Second Circuit.
7A study, as yet unpublished, made by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, indicates an average cost for the printing of records and briefs in
federal appeals of about $580 per case, even excepting the "Big Case" -about 7%
of the total -where the printed record alone runs over 500 pages. Since that is
the only average for the normal appeal and since there are many brief records for
single-point appeals, the nature of the burden in individual cases can be realized.
ssacher v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 347 U.S. 388 (1954),
reversing In re Sacher, 206 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1953); Sacher v. United States, 343
U.S. 1 (1952), affirming United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950).
Citations to law review comments on the earlier case are given in 206 F.2d at 363, n.l.
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it tends generally to be what the individual tribunal desires and deserves. At least the legal principles are adequate.
Therefore, let us keep all the progress we have made in requiring
proper conduct and ability on the part of the legal profession. But
let us also take heed as to a certain correlative matter fully as important but not so well stressed in the ,past, namely, the most effective and modernized organization of the courts for their almost overwhelming tasks. Americans have shown a genius for organization and
invention in things mechanical that is the wonder of the world. Not
the same success has yet governed their efforts in purely human
activities. This I think is because they have not felt the challenge in
like measure, while the pressure of old shackles has been always
heavy and immediate. Here is a vast opportunity; may the courts in
the future prove an object lesson to show what the American genius
can do also in that field of limitless possibility- human organization
for the betterment of mankindl
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